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The Thirteenth, the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth
Amendments of the Federal Constitution, firoria mz o~e,
incorporate the colored race into the body of citizenship,
with equal rights and immunities with other citizens. The
Thkteenth (proclaimed December 18, 1865) declares:
SECTxO i. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted,
shall exist within the United States, or any plac6 subject to their jurisdiction.'
SEc. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation.

Section i of the Fourteenth is:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States ; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,'
without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.

This Amendment was proclaimed July 28, I868: its Pifth
Section is verbally the same as the Second of the Thirteenth
Amendment
The Fifteenth (proclaimed March 30, I87o) declares:
SEcTIOm i. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race,
color or previous condition of servitude.
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The Second Section is verbally the same as that of the
the Thirteenth Amendment: siora.
Under these Amendments, it is evident that to exclude
colored people from places of public resort on account of
their race, is an illegal discrimination. Such discrimination
is to fix upon them the brand of inferiority, and tends to fix
their position as a servile and dependent people. It is, of
course, impossible to enforce equality by law. But the law
simply insures to colored citizens the right to admission, on
equal terms with others, to public resorts and to equal enjoyment of privileges of a quasipublic character.
Before the abolition of slavery, the colored race in the
slave-holding States were not citizens, and their position and
the law applicable thereto has no place in this discussion,
and will, therefore, be passed without comment
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One of the leading cases was decided in 185o in Massachusetts (Roberts v.

The City of Boston, 1850,

5 Cush.

Mass. 198). It was held that provision could be made for
the instruction of colored children, in separate schools established exclusively for them, and their attendance upon the
other schools could be prohibited. Chief Justice SHAW delivered the opinion of the Court, and used this remarkable
language:
The great principle advanced by the learned and eloquent advocate of
the plaintiff [Charles Sumner] is, that by the Constitution and laws of
Massachusetts, all persons, without distinction of age or sex, birth or
color, origin or condition, are equal before the law. This, as a broad general ]frinciple, such as ought to appear in a declaration of rights, is perfectly sound; it is not only expressed in terms, but pervades and animates
the whole spirit of our Constitution of free government. But, when this
great principle comes to be applied to the actual and varied conditions of
persons in society, it will not warrant the assertion, that men and women
are legally clothed with the same civil and political powers, and that
children and adults are legally to have the same functions and be subject
to the same treatment; but only that the rights of all, as they are settled
and regulated by law, are equally entitled to the paternal consideration
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and protection of the law, for their maintenance and security. What
these rights are, to which individuals, in the infinite variety of circumstances by which they are surrounded in society, are entitled, must depend on laws adapted to their respective relations and conditions.

Notwithstanding this statement of the doctrine, th
learned Judge admitted that colored people, the descendants
of Africans, are entitled by law, in Massachusetts, to equal
rights, constitutional and political, civil and social, with
those accorded the white people. To the question, that the
maintenance of separate schools tends to deepen and perpetuate the odious distinction of caste, founded in a deep-rooted
prejudice in public opinion, the Court says that, if such prejudice exists, it is not created by law, and probably cannot
be changed by law; that separate schools could legally be
provided for colored children. The opinions in accord with
this decision, since the Federal Amendments, are upon entirely different grounds, as will be seen further on in this
discussion.
Another leading case was decided in Michigan (Day v.
Owen, 1858, 5 Mich. 52o), which makes the negro inferior
in social standing, and denies him the rights accorded to the
white man. It was held lawful to exclude a colored person
from the cabin on a boat This was a rule adopted and
published by an owner of a boat The Court held that the
reasonableness of the rule does not depend upon the color of
the passenger, or on the class of persons to which he belongs, all of whom are alike excluded, but on the effect the
carrying of such persons in the cabin would have, not on the
owner's business as a carrier, but on the accommodation of
the mass of persons who have a right, and are in the habit
of traveling on the boat As the duty to carry is imposed
by law for the convenience of the community at large, and,
not of individuals, except so far as they are a corporate part
of the community, the law would defeat its own object if it,
required the carrier; for the accommodation of particular individuals, to incommode the community at large. It was
held that the law did not require the owner of the boat to
make any rules, but if he deemed it for his interest to do sof'
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looking to an increase of passengers from the superior accominodations he held out to the public, to deny him the
right would be an interference with a carrier's control over
his own property in his own way, not necessary to the performance of his duty to the public as a carrier. Hence, it
was said that a carrier could make a rule, excluding colored
persons from the cabin of his boat
These two decisions are.a fair exposition ot the law in
the Northern States before the adoption of the Federal
Amendments named in this article.
II.
THE LAW AFTER THE AMENDMENTS.

Under these Amendments, the States can make no discrimination as to their citizens.
In 1866 Congress passed the " Civil Rights Bill" (N4
Stat at Large, ch. 31, page 27), and re-enacted with some
modifications in Sections 16, 17, and 18, of the Enforcement Act, passed May 31, 1870 (16 Stat. at Large, ch. 114,
page x4o). The "Civil Rights Bill" of 1866, was enacted
in view of the Thirteenth Amendment, before the Fourteenth
was adopted, and to wipe out the burdens and disabilities,
the necessary incidents of slavery, constituting its substance
and visible form; and to secure to all citizens of every race
and color, and without regard to previous servitude, these
fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,
namely: the same right to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, to be parties, to give evidence, and to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens. Congress did not, at that time, under the authority
given by the Thirteenth Amendment, adjust the social
rights of any race of men in the community. Congress
assumed to declare and indicate those fundamental rights
which appertain to the essence of citizenship, and the
enjoyment or deprivation of which constitutes the essential
distinction between freedom and slavery. The Thirteenth
Amendment abolished slavery; the Fourteenth prohibited
the States from abridging the privileges or immunities of
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citizens of the United States, from depriving them of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, and from
denying to any the equal protection of the law: CGvil Rights
Cases (1883), 109 U. S. 3Sections i and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of March i,
1875 (i8 Stat. at Large, ch. 114, page 335) are as follows:
Be it enacted, &c., That all persons-within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public cohveyances on land or water, theaters andother places of publicamusement;
subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law, and
applicable alike to citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous condition of servitude.
SeC. 2. That any person who shall violate the foregoing section by denying to any citizen, except for reasons by law applicable to citizens of
every race and color, and regardless of any previous condition of servitude, the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages,
facilities, or privileges in said section enumerated, or by aiding or inciting
such denial, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay the sum of five
hundred dollars to the person aggrieved thereby, to be recovered in an
action of debt, with full costs; and shall also, for every such offence, be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not less than five hundred nor more than one thousand dollars, or
shall be imprisoned not less than thirty days nor more than one year:
Provided,That all persons may elect to sue for the penalty aforesaid, or
to prb'oceed under their rights at common law and by State Statutes ; and
having so elected to proceed in the one mode or the other, their rights to
proceed in the other jurisdiction shall be barred. But this provision shall
not apply to criminal proceedings, either under this act or the criminal
law ofanyState: And providedfurther, That a judgment for the penalty
in favor of the party aggrieved, or a judgment upon an indictment, shall
be a bar to either prosecution respectively.

This law was held to be unconstitutional, because it declares, without any reference to adverse State legislation on
the subject, that all persons shall be entitled to equal accommodations and privileges of inns, public conveyances, and
places.of public amusement, and imposes a penalty upon
any individual who shall deny to any citizen such equal accommodations and privileges. This is not corrective legislation, such as Congress can make; it is primary and direct;
it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of
the right of admission to inns, public conveyances, and
places of amusement. Hence, it is an attempt to supersede
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and displace State legislation on the same subject, or only
allow it permissive force. It ignores State legislation and
assumes that the matter is one that belongs-to the domain of
Congressional regulation. No such plenary power has been
conferred upon Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment
This law is unconstitutional as applied to the several States,
as such legislation is not authorized either by the Thirteenth
or Fourteenth Amendment The Fourteenth Amendment
is prohibitory upon the States only, and the legislation
authorized to be adopted by Congress for enforcing it is not
direct legislation on the matters respecting which the States
are prohibited from making or enforcing certain laws, or
doing certain acts, but is corrective legislation, such as may
be necessary or proper for counteracting and redressing the
effect of such laws or acts: Civil Rights Cases (1883), Io
U. S. 3.
In these cases, Justice BRADLEY delivered the opinion'of
the Court. It was not decided whether the law as it stands
is operative in the Territories and District of Columbia; the
decision only relating to its validity as applied to the States.
Nor was it decided whether Congress, under the commercial
power, may or may not pass a law securing to all persons
equal accommodations on lines of public conveyance between
two or more States.
The fourth section of the Civil Rights Act was held to be
constitutional :
SEc. 4. That no citizen, possessing all other qualifications which are
or may be prescribed by law, shall be disqualified for service as grand or
petit juror in any court of the United States, or of any State, on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude; and any officer or other
person charged with any duty in the selection or summoning of jurors
who shall exclude or fail to summon any citizen for the cause aforesaid,
shall, on conviction thereof, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be
fined not more than five thousand dollars.

This section was held constitutional, as it was entirely
corrective in its character; that disqualifications for service
on juries are only created by law, and the first part of the
section is aimed at certain disqualifying laws, namely: those
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which make mere race or color a disqualification; and the
second clause of this section is directed against those who,
assuming to use the authority of 'the State government,
carry into effect such a rule of disqualification. Thus, in a
Virginia case (Ex fiarte Virginia, 1879, 100 U. S. 3 3 9 ),it
was held that an indictment against a State officer under
this section, for excluding persons of color from the jury
list, is sustainable. The State, through its officer, enforced
a rule of disqualification which the law was intended to abrogate and counteract. Whether the statute book of Virginia actually laid down any such rule of disqualification or
not, the Ste.-, through its officer, enforced such a rule, and
it is against such State action, through its officers and
agents, that the last clause of Section 4 is directed. This
divests it of any unconstitutional character, and makes it
differ widely from the first and second sections of the same
act.
Justice HARLAN dissented from the majority opinion in
the Civil Rights Cases, in forcible language. He said :
The opinion in these cases proceeds, it seems to me, upon grounds entirely too narrow and artificial. I cannot resist the conclusion that the
substance and spirit of the recent Amendments of the Constitution have
been sacrificed by a subtle and ingenious criticism. "It is not the words
of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the law; the letter of the
the law is the body, the sense and reason of the law is the soul." Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, and for the purpose
of securing, through national legislation, if need be, rights inhering in a
state of freedom, and belonging to American citizenship, have been so
construed as to defeat the ends the people desired to accomplish, which
they attempted to accomplish, and which they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental law. By this I do not mean that
the determination of these cases should have been materially controlled
by considerations of mere expediency or policy. I mean only, in this
form, to express an earnest conviction that the Court has departed from
the familiar iule requiring, in the interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to the intent with which they were adopted.

He says the Statute of 1875 is for the benefit of citizens
of every race and color, and secures and protects rights belonging to the black man as a freeman and citizen; nothing
more; that the personal rights and immunities recognized
in the prohibitive clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
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were, prior to its adoption, under the protection, primarily,
of the States, which rights, created by or derived from the
United States, have always been, and, in the nature of
things, should always be, primarily, under the protection of
the General Government. He therefore holds that the law
in question is constitutional, and that the rights which Congress, by the Act of 1875, endeavored to secure and protect,
are legal, not social rights, and the law is for the benefit of
every race and color. Hence, discrimination practiced by
corporations and individuals in the exercise of their public
or quasipublic functions is a badge of servitude, the imposi-"
tion of which Congress may prevent under its power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment;
and so the Act of 1875 is not repugnant to the Constitution.
The theory of the opinion of the majority of the Court,
that the General Government cannot, in advance of hostile
State laws or hostile State proceedings, actively interfere for
the protection of any of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice HARLAN does not accept. He holds that by necessary implication, there is power in Congress, by legislation, to protect a
right derived from the National Constitution; that a prohibition upon a State is not a power in Congress or in the
National Government It is simply a denial of power to
the State, and, therefore, the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment by the majority of the Court, is not authorized
by its language.
IV.
THE COMMON LAW RULE.

The Civil Rights Act seems to have been fraiped to correspond with the law applicable to innkeepers and common
carriers. An innkeeper under the common law is bound to
take in all travelers, and to entertain them, if he can accommodate them, for a reasonable compensation. If he improperly refuses to receive o-p
de for a guest, he is liable to
be indicted therefor. And common carriers are no more at
liberty to refuse a passenger, if they have sufficient room
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and accommodations, than an innkeeper is, to refuse suitable
room and accommodations to a guest: Story on Bailments,
sects. 475-6. And in Rex v. Ivens (1835), 7 C. & P. 2i3;
32 E. C. L. 495, the Court, speaking by Justice COLERIDGE,
said:
An indictment lies against an innkeeper who refuses to receive a guest, he
having at the time room in his house, and either the price of the guest's
entertainment being tendered to him, or such circumstances occurring as
will dispense with that tender. This law is founded in good sense. The
innkeeper is not to select his guests. He has no right to say to one, you
shall come into my inn, and to another, you shall not, as every one coming and conducting himself ina proper manner has a right to be received;
and for this purpose innkeepers are a sort of public servant, they having
in return a kind of privilege of entertaining travelers and supplying them
with what they want.

Thus the public nature of the innkeeper's employment
forbids him from discriminating against any person asking
admission as a guest on account of the race or color of that
person,.provided he has accommodations, and the guest is
willing to pay for entertainment.
The negro is now, by the Constitution of the United
States, given full citizenship with the white man, and all the
rights and privileges of citizenship attend him wherever he
goes. Whatever right a white man has in a public place,
the black man has also, because of such citizenship.
V.
PRIVATE PLACES.

Private entertainment and private places are not governed, in this respect, like a public place. Thus, a mere
private boarding-house is not an inn, nor is its keeper subject to the responsibilities, or entitled to the privileges of a
common innkeeper. To constitute one an innkeeper, within
the legal force of that term, he must keep a house of entertainment or lodging for all travelers or wayfarers who may choose
to accept the same, being of good character or conduct:
Redfield on Carriers, sec. 575. The law does not interfere
with private entertainments, or prevent persons not engaged
in the business of keeping a place of public amusement,
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from regulating admission to social, public or private entertainments given by them as they may deem best, nor does it
seek to compel social equality: People v. King (1888), Iio
N. Y. 418.
In Bowline v. Lyon el al. (1885), 67 Iowa 536, the Iowa
Supreme Court held that. one conducting a private skating
rink could exclude a negro; because it did not appear that
the rink was operated under a license or privilege granted by
the State, or by the City in which it was conducted, or that
it was in any manner regulated or governed by the policd
regulations of the City. Such being the case, it must be
presumed to have been conducted as a private business
merely, and that no person, black or white, had a right to
enter against the will of the proprietor of the skating rink.
When members of the public entered the building, they did
so by permission of the proprietor, or under a contract with
him, and there was no reason why the owner of the skating
rink might not have limited his invitations to certain individuals or classes. This was so because thebusiness was private. The proprietor had the right, at any time, to withdraw the invitation, either as to the general public or as to
particular individuals.
But when the skating rink is a place of public amusement, a different rule prevails. When the place of amusement is licensed by the municipal authorities, and is regulated in the public interest, it is a public place, or quasi
public, giving the legislature a right to interfere. But it
appears that even the owner of a public place of amusement
can make a rule excluding all persons of a certain nationality, as all Germans, or all Irishmen, or all Jews, as such a
law would be entirely reasonable: People v. King (1888),
Iio N. Y. 48; United Stales v. Newcomes (1876), U. S.
D. Ct. E. D. Pa., ii Phila. 519; 22 Int. Rev. Rec. 115.
VI.
INHIBITION OF STATE LIEGISLATION.

Where a State has not violated the provisions of- the Thirteenth, the Fourteenth, or the Fifteenth Amendment, no
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power is conferred on Congress to punish private individuals
who, acting without any authority from the State, and it
may be in defiance of law, invade the rights of the citizens
which are protected by suchAmendments. Hence, when
an act of Congress is directed exclusively against the action
of individuals, and not of the State, the law is broader than
the Amendments by which it is attempted to be justified,
and is, therefore, unconstitutional. The duty of protecting
all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights, was
originally assumed by the States, and it still remains with
them. The only obligation resting upon the United States,
is to see that the States do not deny the right: Le GrandvUnited States (1882), U. S. C. Ct. E. D. Tex., 12 Fed. Repr.
577; Smoot v. RR. Co. (1882), U. S. C. Ct. D. Ky., 13
Fed. Repr. 337; Civil Rights Cases(1883), 109 U. S. 3- So,

where two or more persons conspire to deprive a colored person of the equal protection of the laws, they are liable to the
laws of the State where the offense is committed, and cannot
be punished under an act of Congress: Le Grand v. United
States (1882), U. S. C. Ct E. D. Tex., 12 Fed. Repr. 577.
So the following section of the United States laws is unconstitutional (Sec. 5519, Rev. Stat.):
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise, on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws;
each of said persons shall be punished by a fine of not less than five hundred nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment with or
without hard labor, not less than six months nor more than six years,
or by both said fine and imprisonment.

Justice WOODS said that this Section was passed by Congress without any Constitutional warrant; that it was never
supposed that under the Fourteenth Amendment Congress
could pass a law which would punish any private citizen for
an invasion of the rights of his fellow citizen conferred by
the State of which both were residents: Le Granidv. Uuilel
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States (I882), ,U. S..C. Ct. R. D. Tex., 12 Fed. Repr. 577
[and U. S. v. Harris (1883), 16 Otto (io6 U. S.) 629, 639,
followed in Baldwin v. Franks (1886) 12o U. S. 678.]
The Thirteenth Amendment does not authorize Congress
to pass laws for the punishment of offenses against the
colored race, because this duty is for the States: United
States v. Cruikshank (1875), 92 U. S. 542; Slaughter-house
Cases (1872), 16 Wall. (83 U. S.),36; Frasherv. State (1877),
3 Tex. App. 267.
Congress has no power under the Fourteenth Amendment
to protect the right to the fll and equal enjoyment of the
accommodations, advantages,, facilities, aind privileges of
theaters, inns, and other public places, against violation by
individuals, acting in their private capacity: Charge to the
Grand Jury by Judge EMMONS (1875), 2 Am. L. T. Rep.
(N. S.) 198, C. Ct. W. D. Tenn.
Justice BRADLEY said in the Civil Rizhts Cases (1883),
109 U. S. 3:
It is State action of a. particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject-matter of the Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes void
all State legislation, and State action of' every kind, which impairs the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which injures them in life, liberty or property without due process of law, or
which denies to any of them the equal protection of the laws. * * * *
It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which
are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief
against State legislation, or State action of the kind referred to. It does
not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the'regulation
of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation
of State laws, and the action of State officers, executive or judicial, when
these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the Amendment.
VII.
PUBLIC PLACES.

As the law now is, all persons within the jurisdiction of a
State have a right to the full and equal enjoyment of all accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns,
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
public places of amusement; subject only to the conditions
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and limitations established by law, and applicable alike to
citizens of every race and color, regardless of any previous
condition of servitude. The several States have enacted
laws securing to people of all races equal accommodations in
public conveyances and places of public entertainment or
amusement. The State laws, or civil rights bills, are substantially the same, and make provisions similar to those included in the Civil Rights Law of Congress, enacted in 1875.
[They will be presented in the LEGAL NOTES of a subsequent number of this magazine.-ED.]
The boundaries of public and of private places seem to
merge, so much so that the courts are frequently called upon
to award damages to a party whose rights have been invaded.
The interpretation of the State law will now be presented.
vii (a).
CONCERT HALLS AND THEATERS.

One of the first cases arising under the civil rights law
came up in Mississippi in 1873. The facts of the case are
these: A lessee of a public concert hall refused a man of
color a seat in a public hall. The lessee was arrested and
brought before a justice of the peace, charged on the affidavit
of the party aggrieved with having refused to sell him a
ticket entitling him to admission to a public show or theatrical performance, given at a public hall, because the affiant
was a man of color. The lessee was adjudged guilty of violation of the Act, and the penalty prescribed. The case then
went to the State Supreme Court on writ of habeas corpus,
where the judgment of the lower Court was affirmed. The
Court held that there was no constitutional objection to the
civil rights law of Mississippi; that the assertion of a right
in all persons to be admitted to a theatrical entertainment,
and the punishment as an offense of theact of the owner, lessee
or manager of a public hall, who denies or refuses to sell a
ticket to a person, in no sense appropriates the private property of the lessee, owner or manager, to the public use.

Judge

SIMRALL,
VoL. XXX-6

speaking for the Court, said:
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of such vast magnitude and influence now and hereafter, have
gone into history within the last ten years, that the public mind is not yet
quite prepared to consider them calmly and dispassionately. To the
judiciary, which ought at all times to be calm, deliberate and firm, espe.cially so when the public thought and sentiment are at all excited beyond
the normal tone, is committed the high trust of declaring what are rules
of conduct and propriety prescribed by the supreme authority, and what
are the rights of individuals under them. As to the policy of legislation,
the judiciary have nothing to do. That is wisely left to the law-making
department of the government. A court only consults the policy of a
law, as an aid to attain the legislative meaning and intent.

He said the intent of the law is, that all persons may have
equal accommodations in the vehicles of common carriers,
at the inns, hotels, theaters and other public places of amusement, upon terms of paying the usual prices therefor, and if
any is excluded, it must not be on account of race: Donnel
v. State (1873), 48 Miss. 661.
So in Louisiana, the Supreme Court rendered a decision
consonant with that of the Mississippi Court, holding a pro_prietor of an academy of music liable in damages under the
Statute, for refusing to admit a colored man into the theater
after he had purchased a ticket. Article XIII of the Louisiana (1868) Constitution declares:
All persons shall enjoy equal rights and privileges upon any conveyance
of a public character, and all places of business, or of public resort, or for
which a license is required by either State, parish, or municipal authority,
shall be deemed places of a public character, and shall be open to the accommodation and patronage of all persons, without distinction or discrimination, on account of race or color.

The Court holds that this Article of the State Constitution is not a mere abstraction, but it guarantees substantial
rights: Joseflt v. Bidwell (1876), 28 La. Ann. 382.
So it may be laid down as the rule, that a colored man
-who has purchased a ticket to a public entertainment held
in a theater, cannot be refused admission under the law, because he is a colored person; Baylies v. Curry (1889), 128
Ill. 287.

vn (b).
SKATING RINKS.

A public skating rink comes under the same provision of
law as other places of public amusement. The law gives
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every person certain rights. These rights thus given, include
the equal enjoyment of privileges furnished by managers of
public skating rinks, and any other place of public amusement Thus, a State law making it a misdemeanor to exclude citizens of the State from places of amusement by.
-eason of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, is a
valid exercise of the police power of the State, and a party
can be indicted and convicted of a misdemeanor for excluding a colored man from a public skating rink: People v.
Xing (I888), iio N. Y. 418.
But a party conducting a private skating rink can choose
his patrons, and may exclude a colored man from his rink.
No person, black or white, has a right to enter such private
place against the will of the proprietor: -Bowling v. Lyon
(1885), 67 Iowa 536.
-judge ANDREWS, in People v. Ki'n (1888), 1io N. Y. 426,
says:
The members of the African race, born or naturalized in this country,
are citizens of the States where they reside, and of the United States.
Both justice and the public interest concur in a policy which shall elevate
them as individuals and relieve them from oppression or degrading discrimination, and which shall encourage and cultivate a spirit which will
make them self-respecting, contented and loyal citizens, and give them a
fair chance in the struggle of life, weighted, as they are at best, with so
many disadvantages. It is evident that to exclude colored people from
-places of public resort on account of their race, is to fix upon them a
brand of inferiority, and tends to fix their position as a servile and dependent people. It is, of course, impossible to enforce equality by law.
But the law in question simply insures to colored citizens the right to admission on equal terms with others, to public resorts, and to equal enjoyment of privileges of a quasi public character. The law cannot be set
aside, because it has no basis in the public interest; and the promotion of
the public good is the main purpose for which the police power may be
exerted; and whether, in a given case, it shall be exerted or not, the
legislature is the sole judge, and a law will not be held invalid because, in
the judgment of a court, its enactment was inexpedient or unwise.

This decision conveys the idea that race discrimination as

to public entertainments may be prevented under the law of
the State, as a police regulation; that is, the police power of
the State can enforce a statute to prevent race discrimination
in public places.
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VII (C).
BARBER SHOPS.

So a barber shop is a public place under the law, and the
authority of the State to prohibit discrimination on account
.of color in places of public resort, as a barber shop, is undoubted. The proprietor of such a shop cannot adopt and
enforce a regulation which will not apply to white and colored people alike: .Messengerv. State (1889), 25 Neb. 674.
The Civil Rights Act of Nebraska names barber shops
among public places, and this decision is in accord with the
law controlling other public places.
VII(d).
RFSTAURANT ACCOMMODATIONS.

So a restaurant keeper is guilty of a misdemeanor under
the statute who refuses to serve a colored person with refreshments in a certain part of a restaurant, for no other reason
than that he is colored. This decision was rendered in
Michigan, where there must be, and is, an absolute, unconditional equality of white and colored men before the law.
The white man can have no rights or privileges under the
law that are denied to the black man. The Court does not
recognize the rule adopted in some States, that separate departments may be provided for the colored man, so long as
he is given substantially equality as to accommodations.
The Court held that:
The negro is now, by the Constitution of the United States, given full
citizenship with the white man, and all the rights and privileges of citizenship attend him wherever he goes. Whatever right a white man has
in a public place, the black man has also, because of such citizenship.

The law of Michigan declares:
SECTIoN i. Thepeople of the State of Michigan enact, That all persons within the jurisdiction of said State shall be entitled to the full and
equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, restaurants, eating houses, barber shops, public conveyances on land and
water, theaters, and all other places of public accommodation and amusement, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law,
and applicable alike to all citizens: Pub. Acts, 1885, pp. 131, 132.
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The Court holds that under this Statute, no line can be
drawn in the streets, public parks or public buildings upon
one side of which the black man must stop and stay, while
the white man may enjoy the other side, or both sides; nor
can such a line of separation be drawn in any of the public
places or conveyances mentioned in this act: Ferguson v.
Gies, decided in the Supreme Court of Michigan, October
1o, 189o.

In delivering the opinion of the Court, Judge MoRsE
says:
The prejudice against association in public places with the negro, which
does exist, to some extent, in all communities, less now than formerly, is
unworthy of our race; and it is not for the courts to cater to or temporize
with a prejudice which is not only not humane, but unreasonable. Nor
shall I ever be willing to deny to any man any rights and privileges that
belong in law to any other man, simply because the Creator colored him
differently from others, or made him less handsome than his fellows-for
something he could not help in the first instance, or ever afterward remove by the best of life and human conduct. And I should have but
little respect or love for the Deity if I could for one moment admit that
the color was designed by Him to be forever a badge of inferiority, which
would authorize the human law to drive the colored man from public
places, or give him less rights than the white man enjoys. Such is not
the true theory of either the Divine or human law to be putin practice in
a republican form of government, where the proud boast is that "all men
are equal before the law." '.ne man who goes either by himself or with
his family to a public place, must expect to meet and mingle with all
classes of people. He cannot ask, to suit his caprice or prejudice or
social views, that this or that man shall be excluded because he does not
wish to associate with them. He may draw his social line as closely as he
chooses at honie, or in other private places, but he cannot in a public
place carry the privacy of his home with him, or ask that people not as
good or great as he is, shall step aside when he appcars. All citizens who
conform to the law have the same rights in such places, without regard to
race, color, or condition of birth or wealth.

While this case clearly enunciates the doctrine that separation of the races shall not be allowed in Michigan, yet in
The Peopile ex rel. Workman v. The Board of Education of
Detroit (1869), 18 Mich. 400, it was held that separate

schools for the education of the blacks and the whites might
exist, where the accommodations and advantages of learning were fully equal one with the other, which doctrine is in
conflict with that of Ferguson v. Gies.
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vii (e).
SEPARATE SCHOOLS.

Where the statute does not forbid separate schools, the
weight of authority is that they may be established, provided equal accommodations are furnished for the black
children. This is on the principle that the school authorities have the right to discriminate, in the exercise of their
discretion, as to the methods of education to be pursued with
different classes of pupils, and these authorities have power,
in the best interest of education, to cause different races and
nationalities, whose requirements are manifestly different, to
*be educated in separate places. Such establishment of separate institutions for the education and benefit of different
races, does not imply the inferiority of any race. The right
to the equal protection of the law is not denied by establishing separate schools. It must be remembered that equality
under the law does not mean identity of privileges and
rights. It is not discrimination between the two races which
is prohibited by law, but discrimination against the interests
of the colored race: Peoble ex rel. King &c. v. Gallagher
(1883), 93 N. Y. 438; People ex rel. Dietz v. Faston (1872),
13 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 159.
So in Indiana, separate schools can be established for
black children. The Court holds that the common school is
purely a domestic institution, and subject to the exclusive
,control of the constituted authorities of the State. The
Federal Constitution does not provide for any general system
-of education to be conducted and controlled by the National
Government, nor does it vest in Congress any power to exercise a general or special supervision over the States on the
subject of education. Uniformity is secured when all the
schools of the same grade have the same system of governiment and discipline, the same branches of learning taught,
and the same qualifications for admission. The classification of scholars, on the basis of race or color, and their education in separate schools involves questions of domestic
policy which are within the legislative discretion and con-
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trol, and do not amount to an exclusion of either class: Cory
et a. v. Carter (1874), 48 Ind. 327; see also to the same
effect, Dallas v. Fosdick (1869), 40 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 249.
And generally this line of cases holds that an act authorizing
a classification of children, on the basis of- color, does not
contravene the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, and that colored children residing in a district for
white children, are not, as of right, entitled to admission
into schools for white children, when separate schools are
established for them: State ex rel. Games v. McCann el as.
(1871), 21 Ohio St. 198. Boards of education may classify
either schools or scholars, in any manner whatever, for the
promotion of the best interests of schools and of education,
basing their classification upon age, or sex, or scholarly attainments; or they may classify by color, if in their judgment it becomes necessary or expedient for them to do so.
Classification upon color does not abridge any of the privileges or immunities of a colored man as a citizen of the
United States, nor deny to him the equal protection of the
laws of the State as a citizen: Ward v. Flood(1874), 48 Cal.
36; Roberts v. The City of Boston (1850), 5 Cush. (Mass.)
198; State ex rel. ft9c. v. Cincinnatiel als. (1850), i9 Ohio
178; Van Camfi v. Board of Education of the Incorhorated
Village of Logan (1859), 9 Ohio St 4o6; Peofile v. Board
&c. of Detroit (1869), i8 Mich. 400; State ex rel. Seoulmeyer v. Duffy et. als. (1872), 7 Nev. 342; United States v.
Buntin (1882), U. S. C. Ct. S. D. Ohio, Io Fed Repr. 730.
The Kansas Supreme Court says that unless it appears
clear beyond all question that the legislature intended to authorize the establishment of separate schools, "we should
not hold that any such authority had been given"; that this
power of the legislature may be doubted. But unless the
legislature has clearly conferred power upon the school
boards to establish separate schools for the education of white
and colored children, no such power has been conferred:
Board of Education of The City of Ottawa et al. v. Tinnon
(i88I), 26 Kan. I. And in Iowa, it is held- that a pupil,
otherwise qualified, cannot be excluded from the public
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schools on account of his color, nor, if colored, can he be
compelled to attend a separate school for colored children:
Smith v. Directors&c. (1875), 40 Iowa 518; Clark v. Board
&c. (1868), 24 Iowa 266; Dove v. School Dist. (1875), 41

Iowa 689.
In Illinois, the school authorities are prohibited from excluding children from the public schools on account of color.
A public duty binds such authorities to furnish schools, not
separateschools, for all children, both white and black: People v. Board (1889), 127 Ill. 613, and the Constitution
makes no distinction in regard to race or color of children
who are entitled to share in benefits of the public schools:
People v. Board (1882), IOI Ill. 308, and see dissenting opin-

ion of DANFORTH, J., in People ex rel.King v. Gallagher
(1883), 93 N. Y. 458, which holds that the States have no
right to make any discrimination against the colored race,
even to the establishing of separate schools for their children; that exclusion of colored children from schools for
white children is a discrimination against the colored child
not authorized by the Federal Constitution. FnmCH, J., concurned in this dissenting opinion.
The conflict on this point of separate schools for colored
children, is clear and decided. But the weight of authority
clearly establishes the doctrine that it is constitutional to
establish separate schools for colored children, provided such
schools are substantially the same as those of white children.
Congress has recognized this doctrine, and has established
exclusive schools for the education of the colored race, in the
District of Columbia. The law provides:
SEC. 282. Any white resident shall be privileged to place his or her
child, or ward, at any of the schools provided for the education of white
children in said portion of the district he or she may think proper to select,
with the consent of the school board ; and any colored resident shall have
the same rights with respect to colored schools: Rev. Stat. D. C. page 33 ;
Act of June 25, 1864, ch. 156, section 16. See also 12 Stat. at Large, ch.
I, page 537, Act of July i1, 1862; 12 Stat. at Large, ch. io3,
page 796, Act of March 3, 1863 ; 14 Stat. at Large, ch. 217, page 216, Act
of July 23, 1866; 17 Stat. at Large, ch. io8, page 619, Act of March 3,
1873.
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The Thirty-ninth Congress, which originated and adopted
the Fourteenth Amendment, made appropriations and assigned funds for the support of schools in the District of
Columbia, established for the education of colored pupils exclusively (14 Stat. at Large, ch. 217, page 216, Act of
July 23, i866).
When a State, by its legislature, passes an act which exeludes the negro children of the State from any share of the
proceeds of the "Common School Fund," set apart by the
Constitution, as well as from the annual tax levied under
general laws on the property of white persons for school
purposes, and to give them the benefit of only the fund provided for in the special act, the statute is void in this respect,
as well as regards the partial and discriminating taxation
provided for, as it violates the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution: Dawson v. Lee (1884), 83
Ky. 49.

vii(i).
RULIE AS TO COMMON CARRIERS.

The rule as to common carriers is not entirely uniform.
In Railroad Co. v. Brown (1873), 17 Wall. (84 U. S.) 445, it
was decided under a law of Congress giving privileges to a
railroad company, that a separate car could not be assigned
exclusively to white people and another to the colored. The
provision of law was "that no person shall be excluded from
the cars on account of color." The company provided two cars
but set apart one for colored persons and the other for white,
and such was the arrangement that on the down and up
trips their places were reversed. The cars were alike comfortable, and in turn appropriated to the two races, but separately. A colored woman being excluded from one, and
sent against her will to that assigned to her race, brought
suit against the company, and recovered damages, the Court
holding that the regulation separating the colored from the
white passengers was illegal, and in answer to the railroad
company's claim that so far from excluding this class of persons from the cars, they had provided accommodations for
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them, said, "this is an ingenious attempt to evade compliance -with the obvious meaning of the requirement," which
was not merely that colored people should be allowed to ride;
but that in the use of the cars there should be no discrimination because of their color. This providing separate cars
was, therefore, a discrimination on account of color.
In The West Chester and Philade6bhia RR. Co. v. Miles
(1867), 55 Pa. 209, Judge AGNEW says:
If a negro takes his seat beside a white man, or his wife or daughter,
the law cannot repress the anger or Congress the aversion which some
will feel. However unwise it may be to indulge the feeling, human infirmity is not always proof against it. * * To assert separateness is not
to declare inferiority in either. It is not to declare one a slave and the
other a freeman. That would be to draw the illogical sequence of inferiority from difference only. It is simply to say that, following the order
of Divine Providence, human authority ought not to compel these widelyseparated races to intermix. The right of such to be free from social contact is as clear as to be free from intermarriage. The former may be less
repulsive as a condition, but not less entitled to protection as a right.
When, therefore, we declare a right to maintain separate relations as far
as is reasonably practicable, but in a spirit of kindness and charity, and
with due regard to equality of rights, it is not prejudice, nor caste, nor
injustice of any kind, but simply to suffer men to follow the law of races,
established by the Creator himself; and not to compel them to intermix
contrary to their instincts.

The Pennsylvania Act ot March 22, 1867, provides:
SEcTIoN i. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvaniain General Assembly met, and it
is hereby enacted by the authorityof the same, That on and after the passage of this Act, any railroad or railway corporation, within this Commonwealth that shall exclude, or allow to be excluded, by their agents,
conductors or employees, from any of their passenger cars any person or
persons, on account of color or race, or that shall refuse to carry in any of
their cars thus set apart, any person or persons on account of color or
race, or that shall for such reason compel or attempt to compel any person or persons to occupy any particular part of any of their cars set apart
for the accommodation of people as passengers, shaU be liable, in an
action of debt, to the person thereby injured or aggrieved in the sum of
five hundred dollars: P. L. page 38.

Under this law, a railroad company was held liable for excluding a colored woman from a car where white persons
were. This decision was made by a divided Court The
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case was ordered to be re-argued, and a decision was rendered
in 1878, sustaining the same doctrine, that the railroad company could not exclude colored persons from a certain car
where white people were: CentralRailroadof New Jersey v.
Green and wife (1878), 86 Pa 421.
And in Louisiana, a discrimination cannot be made between white and black passengers. It is held that a common carrier may make reasonable rules and regulations for
the government of the passengers on board his boat, but it
cannot be pretended that a regulation which is founded on
prejudice, and which is in violation of law, is reasonable.
So when a colored woman is excluded from the ladies' cabin
on a boat, because she is colored, she can recover damages
under the law from the common carrier: Decuire v. Benson
(1875), 27 La. Ann. I.

(WYLY, J., dissented).

The Tennessee Code provides that railroad companies may
set apart separate cars for colored persons, provided:
a366. Accommodations equal in all respects in comfort and convenience
to the first-class cars on the train, and subject to the same rules governing
other first-class cars, shall be furnished them: Code of 1884, page 408.

Under this law a railroad company is not liable in damages to a mulatto passenger, who, having declined a seat in a
coach free to persons of both sexes, regardless of race or
color, and equal in all respects to any coach in the train,
and having also refused to surrender her ticket unless admitted to a seat in another coach reserved exclusively for
white ladies and their gentlemen attendants, quits the train,
of her own accord, on being informed by the conductor of
his purpose to eject her on account of her refusal to surrender her ticket: Chesaheake, Ohio and South Western
Railroad Company v. Wells (1887), 85 Tenn. 613.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee does not seem satisfied
with this decision, and in a subsequent case: Afemphis and
Charleston Railroad Co. v. Benson (1887), 85 Tenn. 627,
modifies the language thus:
And that a regulation, assigning a particular car to persons of color,
that car being in all respects equal in comfort to any other in the train,
was reasonable.

RACIAL 'DISCRIMINATION.

No such rule appears in that case. This language was
used in Chesapeake, Ohio and South Western RailroadCompOany v. Wells, subra, in describing the car:
Persons of either sex were allowed in the front car without regard to
color or race.

And the Court further tries to show authority by citing as
-cases in point: West Chester and PhiladetphiaRailroadCo.
v. LMiles (1867), 55 Pa. 209, and Chicago andNorth Western
Railroad Co. v. Williams (1870), 55 Ill. 185. The fact is,
that in Chesapeake, Ohio and South Western RailroadCo. v.
Wells (1887), 85 Tenn. 613, there was no'car set apart for
the accommodation of the colored race, and there was a plain
discrimination against the colored woman. However, when
there is a car set apart for colored persons, of equal accommodations, it is generally sufficient, under the law of many
States. It is held that equality of accommodations does not
mean identity of accommodations, and it is not unreasonable, under certain circumstances, to separate white and colored passengers on a railway train, if attention is given to
the requirement that all paying the same price shall have
substantially the same comforts, privileges and pleasures furnished to others: Logwood and wife v. Memphis and C. Railroad Co. (1885), U. S. C. Ct. W. D. Tenn., 23 Fed. Repr.
318.

In Murphy v. Western and A. RR. and others (I885), U.
S. C. Ct. E. D. Tenn., 23 Fed. Repr. 637, Judge KEY says:
Again, I believe that where the races are numerous, a railroad may.st
apart certain cars to be occupied by white people, and certain other cars
to-be occupied by colored people, so as to avoid complaint and friction;
but if the railroad charge the same fare to each.race, it must furnish, substantially, like and equal accommodations.

So it has been held that on a night steamboat, plying on
public navigable waters, colored female passengers may be
assigned a different sleeping cabin from white passengers.
But such a right to make such separation can only be upheld
when the carrier, in good faith, furnishes accommodations
equal in quality and convenience to both alike: The Sue
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(1885), U. S. D. Ct D. Md., 22 Fed. Repr. 843.

In such a
case, it is a matter which cannot be regulated by State law,
and Congress, having refrained from legislation on the subject, the owners of the boat are left at liberty to adopt in
reference thereto such reasonable regulations as the common
law allows: Hall v. Decuir (1877), 5 Otto (95 U. S.) 490.
Louisiana has passed a statute requiring all railway companies carrying passengers to provide equal, but separate accommodations for the white and colored races, by providing
separate coaches or compartments, so as to secure separate
accommodations. It defines the duties of the officers of such
railways, directing them to assign passengers to the coaches
or compartments set aside for the use of the race to which
such passengers belong. It authorizes the officers to refuse
to carry on their trains such passengers as may refuse to
occupy the coaches or compartments to which he or she is
assigned, and to exonerate such railway companies from any
and all blame or damages that may proceed or result from
such refusal. Penalties are prescribed for both the officers of
the railway companies, and the passengers who refuse to
comply with the law. Street railroads are, however, specially
exempt from the operations of the act: Act of July io,
189o, Lawspage 152.
[Another view of this important subject of separate accommodations for colored people will shortly appear in this
magazine.-ED.]
VIII.
RIGHT TO HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION.

The right of honiestead exemption cannot be denied the
negro citizen. Thus, the Homestead Act of Kentucky of
1886, excluding negroes from the benefit of homestead, is
void under the Constitution of the United States, so far as it
discriminates against the negro citizen: Eubank v. Eubank
(1885), 7 Ky. Law Repr., page 295; Custardand wife v.
Poston andothers (i886), decided in the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky, i S. W. Repr. 434. The negro citizen has
the same right to a homestead as any other citizen; to ex-
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elude him from this right would be a gross violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
IX.
SELECTION OF JURORS.

A State law confining the selection of jurors to white
persons, is in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment,
because it denies to such citizens the equal protection of the
laws, since the constitution of juries is a very essential part
of the protection which the trial by jury is intended to secure. Hence, where the State statute secures to every white
man the right of trial by jury selected from, and without
discrimination against, his race, and at the same time permits or requires such discrimination against the colored man
because of his race, the latter is not equally protected by law
with the former: Strauder v..West Virginia (1879), 10 Otto
(100 U. S.) 303. So the action of a State officer invested
with the power to select jurors, excluding all colored persons
from the list, is repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment His act was ministerial, not judicial,
and, although he derived his authority from the State, he
was bound, in the discharge of that duty, to obey the Federal Constitution and the laws passed in pursuance thereof:
Exparte Virginia (1879), 10 Otto (100 U. S.) 339. But a
colored man cannot have some portion of the jury composed
of his own race as a right. A mixed jury in a particular
case is not essential to the equal protection of the laws. In
selecting a jury to pass upon the life, liberty, or property of
a person, there shall be no exclusion of his race, and no discrimination against them, because of his color: Virginia v.
_Rives (1879), 10 Otto (1oo U. S.) 313.
So the exclusion, because of their race and color, of citizens of African descent, from the grand jury that found, and
the petit jury that was summoned to try, an indictment, if
made by the jury commissioners, without authority from the
Constitution and laws of the State, is a violation of the
prisoner's rights, under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, which the trial Court is bound to redress ; and
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the remedy for any failure in that respect is ultimately in
the United States Supreme Court: Nealv. Delaware(i88o),
13 Otto (103 U. S.) 370.
X.
THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

The right of suffirage cannot be limited to the white race.
The adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution rendered inoperative any provision existing at
the time of the adoption, of a State Constitution, whereby
the right of suffrage was limited to the white race: Neal
v. Delaware (i88o), 13 Otto (103 U. S.) 370; see Citizens,
twir Rights and Immunities, 27 AMERICAN LAW REGISTER, 539; The Right of the Federal Courts to Punish
Offenders AgaiMt the Ballot Box, 29 Id. 337XL
MISCEGENATION.

The State may pass laws prohibiting marriage between
white persons and persons of African descent: Scott v. State
(1869), 39 Ga. 321. Thus, the Revised Code of Georgia of
1882, § 1708, forever prohibits the marriage relation between
white persons and persons of African descent, and declares
such marriages null and void. Chief Justice BROWN says of
this section:
For myself, however, I do not hesitate to say, that it was dictated by
wise statesmanship, and has a broad and solid foundation in enlightened
policy, sustained by sound reason and common sense. The amalgamation
of the races is not only unnatural, but is always productive of deplorable
results: Scott v. State (1869), 39 Ga. 321.

Another section of the Georgia Revised Code of i882

reads:
17io. All marriages solemnized in another State by parties intending
at the time to reside in this State, shall have the same legal consequences
and effect as if solemnized in this State. Parties residing in this State
cannot evade any of the provisions of its laws as to marriage by going
into another State for the solemnization of the marriage ceremony.

To evade the laws of Georgia, in State v. Tutty et al.
Fed. Repr. 753, a white

(189o), U. S. C. Ct. S. D. Ga., 41
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man and a colored woman, who had been indicted in the
State Court for fornication, and repaired to the District of
Columbia and were married, immediately returning to Georgia, and thereupon attempted to remove into the United
States Court the indictments pending against them; but the
petition for removal was denied, and the indictments remanded to the Court of the State.
Where the statutory law is silent as to the effect of marriages between persons domiciled in the State, and who
leave it with the purpose of solemnizing their marriage elsewhere, to evade such laws, but intending to return and live
therein, the marriage may be upheld where the inhibition
relates to form, ceremony, or qualifications depending on age
or like condition. When, however, the marriage is inhibited
by a positive policy of the State, as affecting the morals and
good order of society, and leading to serious social evils, the
marriage will be held void. Such a law does not infringe
the National Constitution: State v. Tutty (I89O), U. S. C.
Ct. S. D. Ga., 41 Fed. Repr. 753. Judge SPEFR, in the
opinion of the Court, says:
It is enough, for the purpose of its duty, for this Court to ascertain that
by a legitimate and settled policy the State of Georgia has declared such
marriages unlawful and void; for while, in this country, the home life of
the people, their decency and their morality, on the bases of that vast
social structure of liberty, and obedience to law, which excites the patriotic pride of our countrymen and the admiration of the world, and while
these attributes of our citizenship should be cherished and protected by
all in authority, and the creatures who defy them should be condemned
by all, the courts, in their judicial functions, are rarely concerned with
the policy of the laws which are made to protect the community.

Such a law is not an infraction of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Judge ERSKIN, said:
Nor, I apprehend, is marriage considered to be embraced within that
clause of Section io of Article I of the national Constitution which prohibits the State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts: Ex rel. Ho6bs and Johnson (1871), U. S. C. Ct. N. D. Ga., x
Woods 537.

The same doctrine has been held in Virginia. In this
State, all marriages between a white person and a negro are
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absolutely void (Code of 1887, ch. iOi, sec. 2:252, page 560).
To evade this statute, a negro man and a white woman,
both domiciled in Virginia, went to the District of Columbia and were married according to the regular forms for
celebrating marriages, and, in about ten days, returned to
Virginia and lived as man and wife. Judge CHRIsTIAN de-

livered the opinion of the Court, and held that although
such marriages are not prohibited by the laws of the District
of Columbia, and this marriage was performed according to
the ceremonies there prescribed, it was void under the laws of
Virginia, and the parties were liable to indictment. That
while the forms and ceremonies of marriage are governed
by the laws of the place where the marriage is celebrated,
the essentials of the contract depend upon and are governed
by the laws of the country where the parties are domiciled
at the time of the marriage, and in which the matrimonial
residence is contemplated: Kinney v. Commonweallk (1878),
30 Grat. (Va.) 858. This case holds that every country has
a right to make laws regulating the marriage of its own
subjects; to declare who may marry, how they may marry,
and what shall be the legal consequences of their marriage.
And it is held in Tennessee, that if the statutory prohibition
is expressive of a decided State policy as a matter of morals,
the courts must adjudge the marriage void as contra honos
mores. So a marriage between a white person and a negro,
valid in Mississippi where celebrated, is void in Tennessee,
in a case where the parties were domiciled in Mississippi at
the time of the marriage: State v. Bell (1872), 7 Bax.
(Tenn.) 9. So a citizen of Tennessee, prohibited by statute
from marrying a certain person, cannot make the marriage
valid by crossing over into a sister State, where such marriage is not inhibited, and then return at once to his domio
cile,baving left for the purpose of evading the statute: Pennegorv. State (1889), 87 Tenn. 244.
The weight of authority is that if the parties, with intention to evade the law, go into a sister State and celebrate
their marriage where it is not inhibited, and then return to
VOL. XXX-7
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their domicile, the marriage is there void: State v. Kennedy
(1877), 76 N. C. 251 ; Williams v. Oates (1845), 5 Ired. L.
(N. C.) 535; Dzire v. Bulard (1855), 10 La. Ann. 411.

But it has been held, contrary to the weight of authority,
that if the parties had no intention of evading a statutory
provision, and consequently no intent to return to the
State of their former domicile, though the parties afterwards did return, the parties were held not guilty of fornication: State v. Ross (1877), 76 N. C.

242.

It was held that a marriage was valid in Massachusetts,
though the parties left the State to avoid a statute, and were
married in Rhode Island, and then immediately returned to
their domicile: Mfedway v. Needham (1819), 16 Mass. i57;
Putnam v. Putnam (1829), 8 Pick. (Mass.) 433; see also
Stevenson v. Gray, &'c. (1856), 17 B. Mon. (Ky.) 193. A

later case in Massachusetts declares such marriages valid,
unless the legislature has clearly enacted that such marriages
out of the State shall have no validity: Commonwealth v.
Lane (1873), 113 Mass. 458 ; and see Brook v. Brook (1861),

9 H. L. Cas.

219.
XII.
CHINESE.

Congress has limited the rights of the Chinese. On May
6, 1882, Congress enacted a law that no alien Chinese shall
be naturalized and become a citizen of the United States
(22 Stat. at Large, ch. 126, sec. 14, page 61). This law forbids the State and the United States Courts naturalizing
Chinese. But a Chinese born of alien parents within the
dominion and jurisdiction of the United States, who resides
therein, and not engaged in any diplomatic official capacity,
is a citizen of the United States: In re Look Tin Sing
(1884), U. S. C. Ct. D. Cal., 21 Fed. Repr. 9o5. Before the
act of Congress forbidding the naturalizafion of Chinese,
it was held by one court that Chinese could not be admitted
to citizenship: Al Kow v. Nunan (1879), U. S. C. Ct D. Cal.,

5 Saw.

552.
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In a revision of the statute of California, the word "white"
was inadvertently omitted. This was amended by inserting
the word "white." So from June 22, 1874, to February I8,
1875, Chinese in California were eligible to citizenship: It
re A Yub (I878), U. S. C. Ct D. Cal., 5 Saw. 155.
But the Chinese have certain rights in this country.
Thus, a law discriminating against Chinese laborers, by forbidding contractors to employ them upon public works, is
illegal and void: Baker et a. v. The City ofPortland(1879),
U. S. C. Ct. D. Ore., 5 Saw. 566.
The provisions of the additional articles to the treaty between the United States and China, of June 18, 1858, ratified and confirmed July 28, 1868, and proclaimed February
5, I87o, Articles V and VI (16 Stat. at Large, page 740),
recognizing the rights of the citizens of China to emigrate
to the United States for purposes of curiosity, trade, and
permanent residence, and providing that Chinese subjects residing in the United States shall enjoy the same privileges,
immunities, and exemptions in respect to travel and residence as may be enjoyed by citizens or subjects of the most
favored nations, constitute a part of the supreme law of the
land. Hence, a State law making it an offense for any
officer, director or agent of a corporation to employ a
Chinese, violates the treaty with China, and is void. It is
also in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution, and is invalid. Chinese or Mongolians
residing within the jurisdiction of a State are "persons"
within the meaning of the term as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment: In re Tiburcio v. Parrott (188o), U. S. C. CL
D. Cal., 6 Saw. 349. Justice FIELD says in Alt Kow v. Nunan
(1879), U. S.C CL D. Cal., 5 Saw. 562:
But in our country, hostile and discriminating legislation by a State
against persons of any class, sect, creed, or nation, in whatever form it
may be expressed, is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution. That Amendment, in its first section, declares who are
-citizens of the United States, and then enacts that no State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge their privileges and immunities. It
further declares that no State shall deprive any person (dropping the distinctive term citizen) of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
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law, nor deny to anyperson the equal protection of the laws. This inhibition upon the State applies to all the instrumentalities and agencies
employed in the administration of its governihent, to its executive,
legislative, and judicial departments, and to the subordinate legislative
bodies of counties and cities. And the equality of protection thus
assured to every one whilst within the United States, from whatever
country he may have come, or of whatever race or color he may be, implies not only that the courts of the country shall be open to him on the
same terms as to all others for the security of his person or property, the
prevention or redress of wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts, but
that no charges or burdens shall be laid upon him which are not equally
borne by others; and that in the administration of criminal justice he
shall suffer for his offenses no greater or different punishment.

See also to the same effect the remarks of the same
learned Judge in In re Ah Fong (1874), U. S. C. CL D. Cal.,
3 Saw. 144.

So a State statute prohibiting all aliens incapable of becoming electors of the State, from fishing in the waters of
the State, violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. Thus, California by "An
Act relating to fishing in the waters of this State," approved
April 23, i88o, enacted as follows:
SEcTIoN i. All aliens incapable of becoming electors of this State are
hereby prohibited from fishing, or taking any fish, lobsters, shrimps, or
shell-fish of any kind, for the purpose of selling or giving to another person to sell. Every violation of the provisions of this Act shall be a misdemeanor, punishable upon conviction by a fine of not less than twentyfive dollars, or by imprisonment in the County Jail for a period of not less
than thirty days: Laws of i88o, page 123.

This was held void as in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States: In re
Ak Chong et als. (i88O), U. S. C. Ct D. Cal., 6 Saw. 451.
This Act was undoubtedly intended by its framers to apply
only to Chinese, but the phraseology is such, that others
than Chinese are included. By Article II of the California
Constitution, the right of suffrage is limited to "male persons;" so that all alien women are "incapable of becoming
electors," and being so, are within the terms of the Statute.
So, also, under the Act to prohibit the issuance of licenses
to aliens not eligible to become electors of the State of California, of April 12, 188o, it is provided:
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SEcTION i. No license to transact any business or occupation shall be
granted or issued by the State, or any county or city, or city and county
or town, or any municipal corporation, to any alien not eligible to become an elector of this State: Laws of i88o, ch. 51, page 39.

So, under the terms of this Act, it is an offense to grant
or issue a "license to transact any business or occupation"
to any alien Caucasian woman. So a similar mistake is
found in Article II of the California Constitution relating
to the right of suffiage, in which it is provided "that no
native of China * * shall ever exercise the privilege of
an elector in this State." Many persons of the Caucasian
race are natives of China, and would fall within the provisions of the State Constitution.
The City and County of San Francisco passed an ordinance arbitrarily regulating the laundry business. Yick Wo
and a hundred and fifty others, all Chinese, were arrested for
the violation of the ordinance. The ordinance was sustained by the State Supreme Court, and by the Circuit Court
of the United States for the District of California. Tick
Wo took his case to the United States Supreme Court on
error from the Supreme Court of the State of California. Wo
Lee took his case to the United States Supreme Court on
appeal from the United States Circuit Court. The Supreme
Court of the United States held that a municipal ordinance
to regulate the carrying on of public laundries within the
limits of the municipality, violates the provisions of the
Constitution of the United States, if it confers upon the
municipal authorities arbitrary power, at their own will, and
without regard to discretion in the legal sense of the term,
to give or withhold consent as to persons or places, without
regard to the competency of the persons applying, or the
propriety of the place selected for the carrying on of the
business. An administration of a municipal ordinance for
the carrying on of a lawful business within the corporate
limits, violates the provisions of the Constitution of the
United States, if it makes arbitrary and unjust discriminations, founded on differences of race, between persons otherwise in similar circumstances. In general, those subjects of
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the Emperor of China who have the right temporarily or
permanently to reside within the United States, are entitled
to enjoy the protection guaranteed by the Constitution and
afforded by the laws; that the guarantees contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution extend to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, without regard to differences of race, of color, or of
nationality: Yick Wo v. Hobkins (I885), i8 U. S. 356.
By the treaty with China of November 17, 188o (22
Stat. at Large, page 827) it is provided:
ART. II. Chinese subjects, whether proceeding to the United States as
teachers, students, merchants, or from curiosity, together with their body
and household servants, and Chinese laborers who are now in the United
States, shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will and accord,
and shall be accorded all the rights, privileges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most
favored nations.

By the Act of July 5, 1884 (23 Stat at Large, ch. 225,
sec. 6, page 116), passed to execute this treaty, a certain certificate of identification from the Chinese government is required for the admission into the United States of "every
Chinese person," other than a laborer, who may be entitled
by said treaty to such admission. The Act of October i,
i888 (25 stat at Large, ch. ro64, page 504), forbids the
coming or return of Chinese laborers to the United States.
On August 17, 1889 (Treasury Decision, 4o9), the Treasury
Department held that the wife of a Chinese merchant who
had never been in the United States, cannot be allowed to
enter the United States, with or without her husband, otherwise than upon the production of the certificate required by
Section 6 of the Act of July 5, 1884. But this decision does
not accord with the doctrine of the courts, because the wife
and children of a Chinese merchant, who is entitled, under
Article II of the treaty of i88o, and Section 6 of the Act of
1884, to come within and dwell in the United States, are entitled to come into the country with him or after him, as
such wife and children, without the certificate prescribed in
said Section 6. Judge DEADY said in the late case of In re
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Chung, Toy Ho and Wng Choy Sin (189o), U. S. C. Ct. D.
Ore., 42 Fed. Repr. 398:
Chinese women are not teachers, students, or merchants; and therefore
they cannot, as such, obtain the certificate necessary to show they belong
to the favored class. But, as the wives and children of teachers, students,
and merchants, they do in fact belong to such class; and the proof of
such relation with a person of this class, entitled to admission, is plenary
evidence of such fact. * * It is impossible to believe that parties to
this treaty [that of 188o], which permits the servants of a merchant to

-enter the country with him, ever contemplated the exclusion of his wife
.and children.

In re Tung Yeong (1884), U. S. D. Ct. D. Cal., 9 Saw.
620, it was decided that the minor children of Chinese mer-

chants were entitled to admission into this country, either
with the father or on being sent for by him, on the ground
that they were not laborers. This decision was made February, 1884, while the Act requiring the production of a
-certificate from "every Chinese person" seeking to enter the
United States was not passed until July 5, 1884, and, therefore, is not authority on the question whether the words
"every Chinese person," in Section 6 of the act, are limited
to teachers, students, and merchants, and do not include
their wives and children. But it holds that the children of
a Chinese merchant, under Article II of the treaty of i88o,
are entitled to admission into the United States with their
father, or after him, and on this principle the wife should be
admitted.
The reason why the wife and children are not expressly
mentioned in the Act, as entitled to admission, is found in
the fact that the domicile of the wife and children is that of
the husband and father. The Act conceding to the merchant the right to enter this country, and dwell therein at
pleasure, includes his wife and minor children.
It will be seen by the acts of Congress, restrictions are ap
plied to Chinese, not applicable to any other race; but these
provisions do not contravene the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution. Denying the Chinese the right of
naturalization, and prohibiting certain classes of them from
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coming into this country, is no infraction of the Federal
Constitution.

XII.
INDIANS.

Indians of the United States are not citizens. They are
within the territorial limits of the United States, but are
aliens. They constitute alien nations, distinct political communities, with whom the United States negotiate, as best
suits the Government, either by treaty made by the President
and Senate, or by act of Congress in the ordinary form of
legislation. But general acts of Congress do not apply to
them, unless so expressed as clearly to manifest an intention
to include them: Elk v. Wilkins (1884), 112 U. S. 94 ; Ex
,jar/e Crow Dog" (1883), 109 Id. 556. Though an Indian
surrenders himself to the jurisdiction of the Federal Government, his surrender must be accepted before he will be
recognized as a citizen: Elk v. Wilkins (1884), 112 U. S. 94.
Indians cannot become citizens of the United States, even if
they have separated themselves from their tribes and reside
among white citizens of a State, if they have not been
naturalized, or taxed, or recognized by the United States
Government as citizens, or by any of the States as such.
In the case of Elk v. Wilkins (1884), 112 U. S. 94, Justices HARLAN and WooDs filed a dissenting opinion, holding that if an Indian was born in the United States, under
the dominion and within the jurisdictional limits thereof, and
had acquired a residence in one of the States, with the
State's consent, and was subject to taxation and other duties
imposed upon citizens, he thereby became a citizen under
the provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
of the Constitution of the United States. They held that:
If he did not acquire national citizenship on abandoning his tribe and
becoming, by residence in one of the States, subject to the complete jurisdiction of the United States, then the Fourteenth Amendment has wholly
failed to accomplish, in respect to the Indian race, what, we think, was
intended by it; and there is still in this country a despised and rejected
class of persons with no nationality whatever; who, born in our territory,
owing no allegiance to any foreign power, and subject, as residents of the

